Simple games cover voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. A simple game or a yes-no voting system is a set of rules that specifies exactly which collections of "yea" votes yield passage of the issue at hand. Each of these collections of "yea" voters forms a winning coalition. We are interested in performing a complexity analysis on problems defined on such families of games. This analysis as usual depends on the game representation used as input. We consider four natural explicit representations: winning, losing, minimal winning, and maximal losing. We first analyze the complexity of testing whether a game is simple and testing whether a game is weighted. We show that, for the four types of representations, both problems can be solved in polynomial time. Finally, we provide results on the complexity of testing whether a simple game or a weighted game is of a special type. We analyze strongness, properness, weightedness, homogeneousness, decisiveness and majorityness, which are desirable properties to be fulfilled for a simple game. Finally, we consider the possibility of representing a game in a more succinct and natural way and show that the corresponding recognition problem is hard.
Introduction 1
Simple game theory is a very dynamic and expanding field. Taylor and Table 1 . Complexity of changing the representation form of a simple game. of problems on weighted games dates back to [19] , where Prasad and Kelly pro- lems. More recent work is related to the notion of dimension considered by Taylor   5 and Zwicker [21, 22] . The dimension of a simple game is the minimum number of mension of a simple game is a NP-hard problem. More results on solution concepts 10 for weighted games can be found in [3, 5, 6, 14] . There also exist works related to 11 economics [4, 10] .
12
Our first objective is to fix some natural game representations. After doing so, as 13 usual, we analyze the complexity of transforming one representation into another 14 and the complexity of the problem of recognizing simple games. Our second aim 15 is to classify the complexity of testing whether a simple game is of a special type. 16 Apart from weighted games there are some other subclasses of simple games which 17 are very significant in the literature of voting systems. Strongness, properness, 18 decisiveness and homogeneity are, among others, desirable properties to be fulfilled 19 for a simple game. Our results are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. 20 Table 1 shows the complexity of passing from a given form to another one. 21 All explicit forms are represented by a pair (N, C) in which N = {1, . . . , n} for 22 some positive integer n, and C is the set of winning, minimal winning, losing or 23 maximal losing coalitions. Note that it is possible to pass from winning (or losing) 24 coalitions to minimal winning (or maximal losing) coalitions in polynomial time, 25 but the other swaps require exponential time. On the other hand, given a game in 1 a specific form, Table 2 shows the complexity on determining whether it is simple, 2 strong, proper, weighted, homogeneous, decisive or majority. Here (q; w) denotes 3 an integer representation of a weighted game where q is the quota and w are the 4 weights. Observe that there are some problems that still remain open. 5 Finally, we refer the reader to Papadimitriou [17] for the definitions of the 6 complexity classes P, NP, co-NP, and their subclasses of complete problems NPC 7 and co-NPC, and the counting class #P. 8 
Recognizing simple games 9
We start stating some basic definitions on simple games (we refer the interested 10 reader to [22] for a thorough presentation).
11
Simple games can be viewed as models of voting systems in which a single 12 alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. 
12
This theorem gives us all the results presented in Table 1 . The polynomial time 13 results are obtained from simple properties of monotonic sets. For the exponential 14 time transformations we provide examples in which the size of the representation 15 increases exponentially. The transformations are similar to the ones used to show 16 that computing a CNF 5 from a given DNF 6 requires exponential time. The dif-17 ference relies in that now instead of transforming the same formula we have to get 18 a different maximal normal form for a formula and its negation.
19
Before proving Theorem 2.2 in detail, we introduce some notations and defini-20 tions together with some preliminary technical results.
21
Given a family of subsets C of a set N , C denotes the closure of C under ⊆, 22 and C the closure of C under ⊇. 
24
The following lemma is proved in [17] . can be obtained in polynomial time.
29
Proof. Observe that, for any set S in C we have to check whether there is a subset 30 (superset) of S that forms part of C, and keep those S that do not have this 31 property. Therefore, the complete computation can be done in polynomial time on 32 the input length of C.
33
Now we define the minimal and maximal subset families. Definition 2.6. Given a family of subsets C of a set N , we say that it is minimal
Definition 2.7. Given a family of subsets C of a set N , we say that it is maximal
As a consequence of Lemma 2.5 we have the following corollary. 
12
Proof. Given a simple game Γ = (N, W ), consider the set
where
Observe that all the sets in R\W are losing
We are going to prove that 16 in two steps:
quently, we have that T ∈ L and that T ∪ {i} ∈ W for some i ∈ N . We also 19 have that T ⊂ U for some U ∈ L. Due to the monotonicity we conclude that
20
U ∪ {i} ∈ W . This means that U ∈ R\W which contradicts that T is maximal
we will show this inclusion in two steps:
obtained from a winning coalition (T ∪ {i}) from removing an element (i).
25
This means that T ∈ R\W since T is a losing coalition;
26
(ii) maximal elements in a set will also be maximal in any subset they appear
28
For the cost of the algorithm, observe that, given (N, W ), the set R has cardinality be exponential in the size of the given one. Therefore, any algorithm that solves 5 the problem requires exponential time.
6
Consider N = {1, . . . , n}, then: 14 Proof. In a similar way as we did in the previous Lemma, we show two examples 15 where size of the computed family can be exponential in the size of the given one. 16 Consider N = {1, . . . , 2n} and coalitions
Therefore, |W m | = n and |L M | = 2 n ;
19
(ii) the simple game defined by
20
As a consequence of Lemmas 2.9 and 2.11 we have Corollary 2.12. Lemmas (2.9)-(2.13) make up Theorem 2.2.
1
The next step is to analyze the computational complexity of the following recog-2 nition problems:
Input: (N, C).
5
Question: Is (N, C) a correct explicit representation of a simple game?
We have in total four different problems depending on the input description:
8 winning, minimal winning, losing and maximal losing. However, the recognition 9 problem becomes polynomial time solvable in all these cases.
10
Theorem 2.14. The IsSimpleE problem belongs to P for any explicit form F:
11 winning, minimal winning, losing, or maximal losing.
12
Proof. The proof follows from the fact that given a family of subsets C of a set stating that whether the family is monotonic 7 or minimal/maximal can be tested 16 in polynomial time.
17
Observe that, as the recognition problem can be solved in polynomial time, we 18 can use any of the proposed representations in further complexity analysis. 
Problems on simple games

20
In this section we consider a set of decision problems related to properties that 21 define some special types of simple games (again we refer the reader to [22] We say that a family of sets is monotonic iff it satisfies the monotonicity property.
Intuitively speaking, if a game is weak it has too few winning coalitions, because 1 adding sufficiently many winning coalitions would make the game strong. Note that 2 the addition of winning coalitions can never destroy strongness.
A simple game that is not proper is called improper.
5
An improper game has too many winning coalitions, in the sense that deleting 6 sufficiently many winning coalitions would make the game proper. Note that the 7 deletion of winning coalitions can never destroy properness.
8
When a game is both proper and strong, a coalition wins iff its complement 9 loses. Therefore, in this case we have |W | = |L| = 2 n−1 .
10
A related concept to the properness and strongness is the dualityness. Proof. To prove this result we provide an adequate formalization of the strong 20 and proper properties in terms of simple properties of the set of minimal win-21 ning or maximal losing coalitions respectively. Those properties can be checked in 22 polynomial time when the games are given in the specified forms.
23
First observe that, given a family of subsets F , we can check, for any set in 24 F , whether its complement is not in F in polynomial time. Therefore, taking into 25 account the definitions, we have that the IsStrong problem, when the input is 26 given in explicit losing form, and the IsProper problem, when the input is given 27 in explicit winning form, are polynomial time solvable.
28
Thus, taking into account that:
29
• a simple game is weak iff
which is equivalent to
The last assertion is equivalent to the fact that there are two maximal losing 34
• a simple game is improper iff
This last assertion is equivalent to the fact that there are two minimal winning
Observe that, given a family of subsets F , checking whether any one of the two 7 conditions hold can be done in polynomial time. Thus, the theorem holds also 8 when the set of maximal losing (or minimal winning) coalitions is given.
9
As a consequence of Theorems 2.2 and 3.4 we have: 
We transform a set splitting instance (N, C) into the simple game in explicit min- have that S ⊆ P and S ⊆ N \P for any S ∈ C m . This implies that S ⊆ P and
32
S ⊆ N \P holds for any S ∈ C since any set in C contains a set in C m .
33
Finally we prove a similar complexity result for the remaining version of the
34
IsProper problem. To complete the proof we provide a reduction from the IsStrong problem for games given in extensive minimal winning form. First observe that, if a family C of subsets of N is minimal then the family {N \ L : L ∈ C} is maximal. Given a game Γ = (N, W m ), in minimal winning form, let us consider its dual game
given in maximal losing form. Of course Γ can be obtained from Γ in polynomial time. Thus Γ is weak iff
iff Γ is improper.
10
Thus, the IsProper problem belongs to co-NP and it is co-NP-hard -in other 11 words it is co-NP-complete. 
Recognizing weighted games
13
In this subsection we study the complexity of determining if a given simple 14 game (in explicit form) is weighted, trade robust or invariant trade robust.
15
Definition 3.8. A simple game (N, W ) is weighted if there exist a "quota" q ∈ R 16 and a "weight function" w : N → R such that each coalition S is winning exactly 17 when the sum of weights of S meets or exceeds q.
18
Weighted games are probably the most important kind of simple games. 19 Any specific example of a weight function w and quota q is said to realize G 20 as a weighted game. A particular realization of a weighted game is denoted 21 (q; w 1 , . . . , w n ), or briefly (q; w). By w(S) we denote i∈S w i .
22
Observe also that, from the monotonicity property, it is obvious that a simple 23 game (N, W ) is weighted iff there exist a "quota" q ∈ R and a "weight function" 24 w : N → R such that following Linear Programming instance Π:
The game (N, W ) is weighted iff Π has a solution and the proposed construction 12 is a polynomial time reduction.
13
For the minimal winning form we provide a reduction to the threshold function 14 problem for monotonic DNF formulas which is known to be polynomial time 15 solvable [11, 18] . For the maximal losing form we make use of duality and provide 16 a reduction to the problem when the input is described in minimal winning form.
17
Given (N, W m ) we are going to prove that we can decide in polynomial time whether the simple game is weighted. For C ⊆ N we let x C ∈ {0, 1} n denote the vector with the i'th coordinate equal to 1 if and only if i ∈ C. In polynomial time we transform W m into the Boolean function Φ W m given by the DNF formula:
By construction we have the following: • only if (⇒): assume that Φ W m is a threshold function. Let w ∈ R n be the weights and q ∈ R the threshold value. Thus we have that
where ·, · denotes the usual inner product. By using (3.2) we conclude that 
21
That is, a weighted game is homogeneous iff the sum of the weights of any 22 minimal winning coalition is equal to the quota. Proof. The polynomial time reduction from the IsHomogeneous problem to the 26 Linear Programming problem, is done in the same way as in the proof of Theo-27 rem 3.9, but considering the instance Π obtained by replacing w(S) ≥ q, in the 28 first set of inequalities of Π, by w(S) = q. It is immediate to see that (N, W ) 29 is homogeneous iff Π has a solution. This modification provides the proof of 30 Theorem 3.12.
31
Now we introduce the remaining subclasses of simple games. tutions make their decisions through voting rules that are in fact decisive games.
10
If abstention is not allowed (see [8] for voting games with abstention) ties are not 11 possible in decisive games.
12
Another interesting subfamily of simple games are the so-called majority games:
13 Definition 3.14. A simple game is a majority game if it is weighted and decisive.
14 Observe that, although a simple game can fail to be proper and fail to be strong,
15
this cannot happen with weighted games (the proof appears in [22] 
Problems on weighted games
24
In this section we consider weighted games which are described by an integer 25 realization (q; w). Observe that it is well-known that any weighted game admits an Question: Does Γ satisfy P?
35
We are interested in problems associated with the properties of being strong,
36
proper, homogeneous, and majority
8
. Observe that for weighted games majority 37 and decisive are just the same property, so we consider only the majority games. Observe that, for any instance of the Partition problem in which the sum of 7 the n input numbers is odd, the answer must be no. IsDecisive) problems, when the input is described by an integer realization of a 10 weighted game (q; w), are co-NP-complete.
11
Proof. From the definitions of strong, proper and majority games, it is straight-12 forward to show that the three problems belong to co-NP.
13
Observe that the weighted game with integer representation (2; 1, 1, 1) is proper 14 and strong, and thus decisive.
15
We transform an instance x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) of the Partition problem into a 16 realization of a weighted game according to the following schema (2; 1, 1, 1) otherwise.
18
The function f can be computed in polynomial time provided q can, and we will 19 use a different q for each problem.
20
Nevertheless, independently of q, when x 1 + · · · + x n is odd, x is a no input for 21 partition, but f (x) is a yes instance of IsStrong, IsProper, and IsMajority, 22 and thus a no instance of the complementary problems.
23
Therefore, we have to take care only of the case in which x 1 + · · · + x n is even. 24 Assume that this is the case and let s = (x 1 + · · · + x n )/2 and N = {1, . . . , n}. We 25 now provide the proof that f reduces Partition to the respective complementary 26 problem.
(a) IsStrong problem
28
For the case of strong games, taking q(x) = s + 1, we have:
29
• if there is a S ⊂ N such that i∈S x i = s, then i/ ∈S x i = s, thus both S and 30 N \S are losing coalitions and f (x) is weak;
31
• now assume that S and N \S are both losing coalitions in f (x). If i∈S x i < s 32 then i/ ∈S x i ≥ s + 1, which contradicts that N \S is losing. Thus we have that 33 For the case of majority games we take again q(x) = s. Observe that f (x)
9 cannot be weak, as in such a case there must be some S ⊆ N for which,
contradicting the fact that s = (x 1 + · · · + x n )/2. Therefore, the game is not 12 majority iff it is improper, and the claim follows.
13
Before finishing this section we introduce the following related problem: 
25
Note that, given an integer realization (q; w) of a weighted game, we cannot 26 yet check whether this game is homogeneous, only whether a given realization is 27 a homogeneous one. We want to remark that the previous result does not imply on |N | variables providing a compact description of the sets in W .
10
• Succinct minimal winning form: the game is given by (N, Φ) but now Φ describes 11 the family W m . Observe again that this form might require less space than the 12 previous one whenever W = {N }.
13
In addition we consider the succinct losing and maximal losing forms. Our first 14 objective again is to analyze the complexity of the recognition problem. As it happened with IsSimpleE problem, we have in total four different prob-20 lems depending on the input description: winning, minimal winning, losing and 21 maximal losing.
22
Unfortunately, we can show that the recognition problem is hard in all the 23 proposed succinct forms thus forbidding a posterior use of such representations. Proof. Observe that, from the Definition 2.1 of the monotonicity property, a set 27 W (L) is not monotonic iff there are two sets S 1 and S 2 such that
. When the game is given in succinct 29 winning or losing form, these tests can be done by guessing two truth assignments 30 x 1 and x 2 and checking that
and Φ L (x 2 ) = 1). Both properties can be checked in polynomial time once S 1 and 32 S 2 are given. Thus the problems belong to co-NP. 33 In the case that Φ represents W m (L M ) we have to check that the represented 34 set is minimal (maximal). Observe that Φ does not represent a minimal (maximal) 35 set if there are α, β ∈ {0, 1} n with α < β such that Φ(β) = 1 and Φ(α) = 1.
36
Therefore, all the problems of recognizing succinct forms belong to co-NP.
37
A Boolean formula is monotonic if for any pair of truth assignments x, y, such 38 that x ≤ y in canonical order (i.e., x i ≤ y i for all i), we have that Φ(x) ≤ Φ(y) 39 (assuming that false < true). The latter problem (i.e., to know whether a Boolean 40 formula is monotonic or not) is co-NP-complete (even for DNF formulas) [15] .
1
Consider the following reduction: given a Boolean formula Φ on n variables we 2 construct Φ on n + 2 variables as follows
Now we have that Φ is monotonic iff Φ is monotonic. Furthermore we have that game. Then the IsSimpleS for the explicit loosing form is co-NP-complete.
10
Recall now that the sat problem asks whether a given Boolean formula has 11 a satisfying assignment. sat is a well known NP-complete problem. Consider the
12
following reduction: given a Boolean formula φ on n variables we construct Φ for 13 minimal winning forms on n + 2 variables as follows
15
We have that φ does not have satisfying assignment iff Φ describes a non empty 16 minimal winning set. Similarly for maximal losing forms, now we should consider
if α = β = 0 and x = 0 n 1, if α = β = 0 and x = 0 n .
18
Thus the minimal winning and the maximal losing problems are co-NP-hard. 
24
For the four proposed explicit representations of a simple game, we have stud-
25
ied the complexity of deciding whether the given game is strong, proper, weighted,
26
homogeneous, decisive or majority. In the same vein, given a weighted game de-
27
scribed by an integer representation (q; w), we have also considered the complexity 28 of deciding whether the game is strong, proper, homogeneous or majority. 
17
Interestingly enough, we have shown in Theorem 3.9 that we can decide in 18 polynomial time whether a simple game is weighted. This result opens the possi-19 bility of analyzing the complexity of problems on weighted games described in an 20 explicit form. In particular, as weighted games are games with dimension 1, our 21 results imply that we can decide in polynomial time whether a simple game has 22 dimension 1. Recall that the results in [2] show that computing the dimension of a 23 simple game is NP-hard. The latter result is obtained when the game is described 24 as the intersection of some weighted games. It will be of interest to determine 25 whether the dimension of a simple game given in explicit form can be computed in 26 polynomial time. The same questions can also be formulated for other parameters 27 and solution concepts on simple games. We would also like to acknowledge Gerth S. Brodal from University of Aarhus for 39 valuable comments and constructive criticism.
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